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Based on the observation that the category of concept spaces with the positive information
topology is equivalent to the category of countably based T0 topological spaces, we inves-
tigate further connections between the learning in the limit model of inductive inference
and topology. In particular, we show that the “texts” or “positive presentations” of concepts
in inductive inference can be viewed as special cases of the “admissible representations” of
computable analysis.Wealso showthat several structural properties of concept spaceshave
well known topological equivalents. In addition to topological methods, we use algebraic
closure operators to analyze the structure of concept spaces, and we show the connection
between these two approaches. The goal of this paper is not only to introduce new per-
spectives to learning theorists, but also to present the ﬁeld of inductive inference in a way
more accessible to domain theorists and topologists.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It is well known among learning theorists that there are many connections between topology and inductive inference
[17,22], and that some important notions in inductive inference can be easily formalized by introducing the positive in-
formation topology onto a concept space [19]. Here we take “concept space” to mean a subset of the powerset of natural
numbers.What is lesswell known is that every countably based T0 topological space is homeomorphic to some concept space.
Therefore, it is important to clarify the connection between properties of concept spaces proposed by learning theorists and
properties of topological spaces, which is one of the goals of this paper. For example, we show that the property that every
concept has a ﬁnite tell-tale [1] is equivalent to a separation axiom that has been around since the early 1960s [3], and also
that “texts” or “positive presentations” are a special kind of admissible representation [26] used in computable analysis [29].
In addition to topological methods, we also use algebraic closure operators to analyze structural properties of concept
spaces. This should not be confused with the topological closure operator deﬁned on the concept space, instead we are
referring to an operator deﬁned on the set of natural numbers that arises when one embeds the concept space into a
minimal algebraic closed set system. This approach has the beneﬁt that it retains some information about the structure of a
concept space that is lost when we take a purely topological view.
Another one of our goals is to explain some of the basic concepts of inductive inference in awaymore accessible to domain
theorists and topologists. It is our hope that this will promote a more ﬂuid exchange of ideas between these ﬁelds.
We do not consider computability issues in this paper, and so the learnerswe considerwill be non-computable in general.
In the next sectionwe introduce concept spaces and learning in the limit with an emphasis on the topological characteristics

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of these notions. In Section 3, we give topological characterizations of reductions between concept spaces (in the sense of
Jain and Sharma [13]). We introduce algebraic closure operators in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze some well known
structural properties of concept spaces using topology and algebraic closure operators. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Concept spaces and learning in the limit
We assume the reader has a basic knowledge of topology [16]. In this paper, X ⊆ Y will mean that X is a subset of Y ,
and X ⊂ Y will mean that X is a proper subset of Y . We denote set difference by X\Y . Given a function f from a set X to
a set Y , X will be called the “domain” of f , and Y the “codomain” of f . The range of f will be denoted rng(f ). The image of
a subset S ⊆ X under f will be denoted f (S). Given functions f and g such that the domain of g equals the codomain of f ,
their composition will be denoted g ◦ f . The set of natural numbers will be denoted by N. A concept space is a collection of
subsets of N. An element of a concept space is called a concept. Given a concept space L and any subset S of N, we deﬁne
↑L S = {L ∈ L | S ⊆ L} and ↓L S = {L ∈ L | L ⊆ S}.
Deﬁnition 1 (Luo and Schulte [19]). Let L be a concept space. A subset of L is called a -basic open set if and only if it is
equal to ↑L F for some ﬁnite subset F of N. An arbitrary union (including the empty union) of -basic open sets is called
a -open set. -Closed sets and -clopen sets are deﬁned as usual. The resulting topology is called the positive information
topology (-topology) on the concept space L. A mapping between concept spaces that is continuous with respect to the
-topologies is said to be -continuous.
Recall that a basis for a topological space X is a set B of open subsets of X such that every open subset of X is equal to the
union of some subset of B (the union of an empty subset of B is the empty set). A topological space X is a countably based
space if and only if X has a countable basis. X satisﬁes the T0 separation axiom (or X is a T0 space) if and only if for every pair
of distinct points of X there is an open subset of X that contains precisely one of the points.
Proposition 2. Every countably based T0 space is homeomorphic to some concept space with the -topology.
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is well known (for example, see the proof of Lemma II-3.4 (ii) in [10]). Let X be a countably
based T0 space and let {βi}i∈I be a countable base for X , where I ⊆ N. For x ∈ X , deﬁne η(x) = {i ∈ I | x ∈ βi}. Deﬁne P(X) ={η(x) | x ∈ X}. It is clear that P(X) is a concept space, so it only remains to show that η: X → P(X) is a homeomorphism (i.e.,
η is a continuous bijection and η−1 is also continuous).
We ﬁrst show that η is a bijection. If x, y ∈ X are such that x 	= y then the T0 property guarantees that there is an open
set U that contains either x or y, but not both (without loss of generality, assume x ∈ U and y 	∈ U). Since {βi}i∈I is a basis
for X , it follows that there is some i ∈ I such that x ∈ βi ⊆ U. Hence, i ∈ η(x) but i 	∈ η(y), so η(x) 	= η(y). Therefore, η is
injective, and since it is surjective by deﬁnition, η is a bijection.
To show that a function is continuous, it sufﬁces to show that the preimage of every basic open set is open. Thus, to
prove that η is continuous, it sufﬁces to show that η−1(↑P(X) F) is open in X for any ﬁnite set F of natural numbers. If
F 	⊆ I then ↑P(X) F is empty, hence η−1(↑P(X) F) is empty, which is open by deﬁnition. Otherwise, it is easily seen that
η−1(↑P(X) F) = ⋂i∈F βi which is the intersection of a ﬁnite number of open sets and therefore open.
Finally, η−1 is continuous because for each i ∈ I, η(βi)= ↑P(X) {i} which is clearly -open in P(X). 
Since every concept space is a countably based T0 space, Proposition 2 implies that the category of concept spaces and
-continuous maps is equivalent to the category of countably based T0 spaces and continuous maps (see [20] for more on
category theory).
Let T (L) =
{
T ∈ (N ∪ {#})N | rng(T)\{#} ∈ L
}
. T (L) will be called the set of texts for concepts in L. Here, (N ∪ {#})N
is the set of all functions from N to N ∪ {#}, and we can alternatively think of it as the set of all countably inﬁnite sequences
of elements ofN ∪ {#}. The element # is a special symbol not inN that is necessary for deﬁning texts for empty concepts. For
formal purposes, wewill view T (L) as a concept space by identifying each function T ∈ (N ∪ {#})N with its graph (properly
encoded as a set of natural numbers).
Deﬁne the mapping τL: T (L) → L so that τL(T) = rng(T)\{#} for each T ∈ T (L). We will say that T is a text for L ∈ L
if and only if τL(T) = L. Intuitively, T is a text for L if and only if it is an inﬁnite enumeration of the elements of L, with
occasional pauses denoted by #. It is easily seen that τL: T (L) → L is a -continuous quotient map.
Recall that a topological space is zero-dimensional if and only if it has a basis of clopen sets. T (L) has a basis consisting of
sets of the form
↑T (L) σ = {T ∈ T (L) | σ is an initial segment of T},
where σ ranges over ﬁnite sequence of elements of (N ∪ {#}). Since
T (L)\(↑T (L) σ ) =
⋃
σ ′ 	=σ
↑T (L) σ ′,
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both↑T (L) σ and its complement T (L)\(↑T (L) σ ) are open, hence clopen, for eachσ . Therefore, T (L) is a zero-dimensional
concept space.
The mapping τL has a kind of “universal” property as seen in the following theorem. The proof is based on Matthias
Schröder’s proof of his Theorem 12 characterizing admissible representations of topological spaces [26].
Theorem 3. LetK be a zero-dimensional concept space, and f :K → L be a-continuousmap. Then there exists a-continuous
map g:K → T (L) such that f = τL ◦ g.
Proof. Let {βi}i∈N be a sequence of clopen sets forming a basis for K. Given K ∈ K, deﬁne the sequence {βKj }j∈N so that for
each j ∈ N, βKj = βj if K ∈ βj , and βKj = K\βj if K 	∈ βj . Note that βKj is open for all j ∈ N because βj is clopen. Let {Fi}i∈N
be an enumeration of all ﬁnite subsets of natural numbers in such a way that every subset occurs inﬁnitely often in the
sequence. Let S be the set of all non-empty ﬁnite sequences of natural numbers. Given a ﬁnite set F of natural numbers,
we denote by seq(F) the lexicographically smallest sequence that contains exactly the elements of F if F is non-empty, and
deﬁne seq(F) = # if F is the empty set.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a function p:K × N → S ∪ {#}. For K ∈ K and i ∈ N, deﬁne
p(K , i) =
{
seq(Fi) if f (
⋂
j≤i βKj ) ⊆↑L Fi;
# otherwise.
We deﬁne g(K) = p(K , 0)  p(K , 1)  p(K , 2)  · · ·, where  denotes concatenation of sequences.
Choose K ∈ K and let i ∈ N be such that Fi ⊆ f (K). Since f is continuous, f−1(↑L Fi) is a -open subset of K, and since{βi}i∈N forms a basis forK there is somem ∈ N such that K ∈ βm = βKm ⊆ f−1(↑L Fi). Since the set Fi occurs inﬁnitelymany
times in our enumeration of the ﬁnite subsets of natural numbers, there exists n ≥ m such that Fn = Fi and it follows that
p(K , n) = seq(Fi). Furthermore, for each i, if p(K , i) = seq(Fi), then Fi ⊆ f (K) by our deﬁnition of p. Thus, it is easily seen
that g(K) is a text for f (K), and therefore f = τL ◦ g.
Next, to check that g is-continuous, note that it sufﬁces to only check that the preimage under g of every-basic open
set is -open. Let σ be a ﬁnite sequence of elements of (N ∪ {#}). If g−1(↑T (L) σ ) is empty then it is open by deﬁnition.
Otherwise, letK ∈ g−1(↑T (L) σ )begiven. Choosen large enough thatσ is an initial preﬁxofp(K , 0)  p(K , 1)  · · ·  p(K , n).
Then UK = ⋂ni=0 βKi is a -open subset of K containing K . Furthermore, given K ′ ∈ UK , we must have βK ′i = βKi for 0 ≤
i ≤ n, which implies p(K ′, i) = p(K , i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, K ′ ∈ g−1(↑T (L) σ ), and since K ′ was arbitrary it follows that
UK ⊆ g−1(↑T (L) σ ). Therefore, g−1(↑T (L) σ ) is equal to the union of-open sets and it follows that g is-continuous. 
Theorem 3 essentially means that the pair 〈T (L), τL〉 is an admissible representation for L (for more on admissible
representations and their applications in computable analysis, see [26,29]). In light of Theorem3, admissible representations
provide a notion of a “text” to a topological space, without having to ﬁrst ﬁnd a homeomorphic concept space. We get a nice
corollary that follows from Schröder’s Generalized Main Theorem1 [26] and our Theorem 3.
Corollary 4. A function f :K → L between concept spaces is -continuous if and only if there is a -continuous function
g: T (K) → T (L) such that f ◦ τK = τL ◦ g.
The -continuous function g in the corollary can be thought of as an operator that gradually reads in a text for some
K ∈ K and outputs a text for f (K) ∈ L. Since a ﬁnite portion of the output of g depends only on a ﬁnite portion of the input,
we can see that this is essentially the same as the enumeration operators used in analyzing the reducibility of one concept
space to another (see the following section).
A hypothesis space for a concept space L is a pair 〈H, h〉, where H is a discrete concept space (i.e., the -topology is the
discrete topology) and h:H → L is a -continuous surjective function. Every function from a discrete space is continuous,
but we include the -continuity requirement to allow the deﬁnition to be easily generalized to non-discrete hypothesis
spaces. We will give an example of a non-discrete hypothesis space towards the end of this paper. We should also point
out that every discrete concept space is countable, but since non-countable concept spaces would not be learnable with an
uncountable discrete hypothesis space anyway (see [21]), this does not pose a problem for us.
Given a hypothesis space 〈H, h〉 forL, we letHN denote the concept space of countably inﬁnite sequences of concepts inH.
If we viewN as a concept space homeomorphic to the natural numbers with the discrete topology, thenHN is an exponential
object [20] in the category of concept spaces and -continuous functions. But for our purposes, we can just think of the
concepts in HN as being the graphs of functions from N to H (properly encoded as natural numbers). Thus the -topology
onHN is similar to the -topology on T (L), and both can be thought of as subspaces of the Baire space [15]. We ﬁrst give a
topological deﬁnition of learning in the limit.
1 Note that the sequential continuity mentioned in [26] is equivalent to the usual notion of continuity for countably based spaces.
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Deﬁnition 5. A learner forLwith respect to the hypothesis space 〈H, h〉 is a-continuous functionψ : T (L) → HN. We say
thatψ learnsL in the limit from positive data if and only if for every T ∈ T (L), the sequenceψ(T) of elements ofH converges
to some H ∈ H such that τL(T) = h(H). L is said to be learnable in the limit from positive data if and only if there exists a
learner that learns Lwith respect to some hypothesis space.
The word “converges” in the above deﬁnition is to be taken in the topological sense [16]. Thus, if we let limH:HN → H
be the function that sends sequences of elements of H to the limit of the sequence (if it exists), we can reword the above
deﬁnition by saying that ψ learns L in the limit from positive data if and only if τL = h ◦ limH ◦ ψ . Note that limH is only
a partial function, and is not -continuous in general.
We next give what we will call the “standard” deﬁnition of learning in the limit. Let SEQ be the set of all ﬁnite sequences
of elements of N ∪ {#}. Given a text T , we let T[n] denote the initial segment of T of length n.
Deﬁnition 6 (Gold [11]). A learner for Lwith respect to the hypothesis space 〈H, h〉 is a functionψ : SEQ → H ∪ {?}, where
? is a special symbol not inH. We say that ψ learns L in the limit from positive data if and only if for every T ∈ T (L), there is
some H ∈ H and some m ∈ N such that ψ(T[n]) = H for all n ≥ m and τL(T) = h(H). L is said to be learnable in the limit
from positive data if and only if there exists a learner that learns Lwith respect to some hypothesis space.
Note that we do not require ψ to be computable. Since we have required that hypothesis spaces be discrete, it is not
difﬁcult to see that both deﬁnitions give the same notion of learnability to concept spaces. Although the deﬁnitions of a
learner are technically different, it is easy enough to convert one type of learner to the other type so we will not be overly
concerned with the differences.
3. Reductions between concept spaces
In this section, we analyze reductions between concept spaces (see [13,12]). The basic idea is that if we have a reduction
from a concept space J to a concept spaceK, then we can convert any text T for a concept in J to a text T ′ for some concept
in K, in a way that if we can identify τK(T ′) then we can identify τJ (T). This gives us a means of reducing the problem of
learning J to the problem of learning K.
The following is a variation of the deﬁnition given in [13] for reductions between concept spaces, where enumeration
operators are replaced by continuous functions. It is easy to see that the deﬁnitions give equivalent notions of reducibility
when we allow non-computable enumeration operators.
Deﬁnition 7. Let J and K be concept spaces, and 〈HJ , hJ 〉 and 〈HK, hK〉 be hypothesis spaces for J and K, respectively.
We let limHJ :HNJ → HJ and limHK :HNK → HK denote the respective limit functions. Aweak reduction fromJ toK (with
respect to 〈HJ , hJ 〉 and 〈HK, hK〉) is a pair 〈,	〉 such that
1. : T (J ) → T (K) and 	:HNK → HNJ are -continuous functions,2 and
2. for any f : T (K) → HNK,
τK = hK ◦ limHK ◦ f ⇒ τJ = hJ ◦ limHJ ◦ 	 ◦ f ◦ .
If, in addition, τJ (T) = τJ (T ′) ⇒ τK ◦ (T) = τK ◦ (T ′) for all T and T ′ in T (J ), then we say that 〈,	〉 is a strong
reduction from J to K.
Note that f : T (K) → HNK in the above deﬁnition varies over all functions, and not just continuous ones. The deﬁnition
above says that if 〈,	〉 is a weak reduction from J to K and f learns K, then 	 ◦ f ◦  learns J . Thus, we can reduce the
problem of learning J to the problem of learning K. Below, we will write J ≤W K if there exists a weak reduction from J
to K, and write J ≤S K if there exists a strong reduction.
Since we are only dealing with discrete hypothesis spaces and are not concerned with computability issues, we obtain
the following simpler characterization of weak reductions.
Proposition 8. Let J and K be concept spaces. J ≤W K (with respect to any choice of hypothesis spaces) if and only if there
exists a -continous function : T (J ) → T (K) and an equivalence relation ≡K on K such that
τJ (T) = τJ (T ′) ⇐⇒ τK((T)) ≡K τK((T ′))
for every T , T ′ ∈ T (J ). Furthermore, J ≤S K if and only if there exists a  and ≡K as above in which ≡K is the usual equality
on K.
2 To make our deﬁnition more faithful to the original deﬁnition it may be preferable to allow 	 to be a partial continuous function, since we only care
about 	 ’s behaviour on converging sequences ofHNK . However, since we do not require 	 to be effective, allowing 	 to be partial would not affect any of
the following arguments, so we will just assume it is total for simplicity.
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Proof. Assume that 〈,	〉 is a weak reduction from J to K. Deﬁne a relation ≡K on K such that K ≡K K ′ if and only if
K = K ′ or else there are TK , TK ′ ∈ T (J ) such that τJ (TK) = τJ (TK ′) and τK((TK)) = K and τK((TK ′)) = K ′. It is easy to
check that ≡K is an equivalence relation, and that τJ (T) = τJ (T ′) implies τK((T)) ≡K τK((T ′)) for all T , T ′ ∈ T (J ).
It remains to show that τK((T)) ≡K τK((T ′)) always implies τJ (T) = τJ (T ′). First note that τK((T)) = τK((T ′))
implies that τJ (T) = τJ (T ′) for all texts T and T ′ in T (J ). This is because we can deﬁne a (possibly non-continuous)
f : T (K) → HNK that, for each K ∈ K, sends every text in τ−1K (K) to a unique element of (hK ◦ limHK)−1(K). Clearly f
satisﬁes τK = hK ◦ limHK ◦ f , so it follows that τJ = hJ ◦ limHJ ◦	 ◦ f ◦ . Therefore, if τK((T)) = τK((T ′)), then
since f ((T)) = f ((T ′)), it follows that τJ (T) = τJ (T ′).
Now, assume that K = τK((T)) ≡K τK((T ′)) = K ′. If K = K ′ then τJ (T) = τJ (T ′) follows from the argument in the
previous paragraph. Otherwise, by deﬁnition there are TK and TK ′ in T (J ) such that τJ (TK) = τJ (TK ′) and τK((TK)) = K
and τK((TK ′)) = K ′. Therefore, τJ (T) = τJ (TK) = τJ (TK ′) = τJ (T ′).
Thus,  and ≡K fulﬁll the claim of the proposition, and ≡K is the usual equality on K if and only if 〈,	〉 is a strong
reduction.
For the converse, assume that  and ≡K satisfy the conditions of the proposition. For each J ∈ J , let HJ ∈ HJ be such
that hJ (HJ) = J. We next deﬁne a function φ:HK → HJ . For H ∈ HK, if there is T ∈ T (J ) such that τJ (T) = J and
τK((T)) = hK(H), then deﬁneφ(H) = HJ . If there is no such T ∈ T (J ), then deﬁneφ(H) to be any element ofHJ . Deﬁne
	:HNK → HNJ so that 	(S)(n) = φ(S(n)) for each S ∈ HNK and n ∈ N. 	 is clearly -continuous, and for every J ∈ J and
T ∈ τ−1J (J), if S ∈ HNK is such that hK(limHK(S)) = τK((T)), then hJ (limHJ (	(S))) = J. Therefore, 〈,	〉 is a weak
reduction from J to K, and it is a strong reduction if ≡K is the equality on K. 
The characterization of weak reductions in Proposition 8 is much easier to work with, and if we took it as the deﬁnition of
a weak reduction then we could analyze reductions between non-countable concept spaces without having to worry about
non-countable discrete hypothesis spaces (however, if we were to use non-discrete hypothesis spaces then the existence of
	 would be non-trivial and should not be discarded from the deﬁnition).
As an example, let R be a concept space homeomorphic to the real numbers with the usual topology,3 and let L be any
concept space. Since T (L) is homeomorphic to a subset of the Baire space, and the Baire space is homeomorphic to the
irrational numbers as a subspace of the reals, there exists a -continuous injection φ: T (L) → R. By Theorem 3, there is
a -continuous : T (L) → T (R) such that φ = τR ◦ . Since φ is an injection, it is clear that there is an equivalence
relation ≡R on R such that  and ≡R satisfy the requirement of Proposition 8. Thus, in a sense, every concept space is
weakly reducible to the space of real numbers.
Next we give a more direct characterization of when J is weakly reducible to K, provided that J is learnable in the
limit from positive data. First an easy lemma, which we give without proof. We let ε denote the empty sequence in SEQ . For
σ ∈ SEQ , let content(σ ) be the set of elements in σ other than “#”.
Lemma 9. Let L be a learnable concept space with hypothesis space 〈H, h〉. Then there exists a “standard ” learner ψ : SEQ →
H ∪ {?} for L such that4
1. ψ(ε) = ?,
2. ψ(σ) 	= ? implies ψ(σ  x) 	= ? for all σ ∈ SEQ and x ∈ N ∪ {#} such that content(σ ) ∪ {x} ⊆ L for some L ∈ L, and
3. ψ(σ) 	= ? implies content(σ ) ⊆ h(ψ(σ)) for all σ ∈ SEQ .
Recall that a function f : X → Y between topological spaces is open if the image of every open U ⊆ X under f is open in
Y . For example, it is easy to see that τL is an open map for every concept space L.
Theorem 10. Let J be a learnable concept space and letK be an arbitrary concept space. Then J ≤W K if and only if there exists
a subspace S of K and an open surjective function f : S → J .
Proof. (⇒). Assume that 〈,	〉 is a weak reduction from J to K. Deﬁne
S = {K ∈ K | (∃T ∈ T (J ))[τK((T)) = K]}.
Deﬁne f : S → J so that f (K) = J if and only if there is a text T ∈ T (J ) such that τJ (T) = J and τK((T)) = K . As
shown in the proof of Proposition 8, τK((T)) ≡K τK((T ′)) implies τJ (T) = τJ (T ′), which implies that J is uniquely
determined by K , hence f is well-deﬁned. Clearly, f is a total surjective function from S to J .
Let U be a -open subset of S . Then W = τJ (−1(τ−1K (U))) is -open in J because  and τK are -continuous and
τJ is an open map. Furthermore, it is clear from the deﬁnition of f that W = f (U). It follows that f is an open surjective
function from a subset of K to J .
3 The set of all open intervals with rational endpoints is a countable basis for the space of reals, which is clearly a T0 space, soR can be constructed as in
the proof of Proposition 2.
4 Condition 3 is known as “consistency” (see [1]).
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(⇐). Assume that S is a subspace of K and f : S → J is an open surjection. Let ψ be a learner for J fulﬁlling Lemma 9,
and let 〈H, h〉 be the corresponding hypothesis space.We deﬁne functions θ : SEQ → SEQ andφ: SEQ → S ∪ {?} in parallel.
Deﬁne θ(ε) = ε and φ(ε) = ?. Assume θ(σ ) and φ(σ) are deﬁned, and let x ∈ N ∪ {#} be given. If there is no J ∈ J such
that content(σ ) ∪ {x} ⊆ J, then deﬁne θ(σ  x) = # andφ(σ  x) = ?. Otherwise, deﬁne θ(σ  x) andφ(σ  x) according
to the following cases:
Case 1. If ψ(σ  x) = ?, then let θ(σ  x) = θ(σ )  # and let φ(σ  x) = ?.
Case 2. If ψ(σ  x) 	= ψ(σ), then deﬁne θ(σ  x) = θ(σ )  # and φ(σ  x) = K , where K ∈ S is chosen so that f (K)
= h(ψ(σ  x)) and content(θ(σ )) ⊆ K . It is shown below that such a K necessarily exists.
Case 3. Otherwise, ψ(σ  x) = ψ(σ) 	= ?. For i ≥ 0, let
Xi = (φ(σ ) ∩ Fi) ∪ content(θ(σ )),
where we deﬁne Fi = {x ∈ N | x < i} for i ∈ N. Let j ≥ 0 be the largest number less than or equal to the length of σ  x such
that
↑J content(σ  x) ⊆ f (↑S Xj).
If φ(σ) ∩ Fj is the empty set, then let τ = #. Otherwise, let τ be the (ﬁnite) sequence containing exactly the elements
of φ(σ) ∩ Fj in ascending order. Finally, deﬁne φ(σ  x) = φ(σ) and θ(σ  x) = θ(σ )  τ .
Claim. θ and φ are well-deﬁned, and for all σ ∈ SEQ , if there is J ∈ J such that content(σ ) ⊆ J and ψ(σ) 	= ?, then
1. f (φ(σ )) = h(ψ(σ)),
2. content(θ(σ )) ⊆ φ(σ),
3. ↑J content(σ ) ⊆ f (↑S content(θ(σ ))).
Proof. The proof is by induction on σ . The claim holds trivially if ψ(σ) = ?, and therefore holds when σ = ε by our choice
of ψ . Assume the claim holds for σ and let x ∈ N ∪ {#} be such that content(σ ) ∪ x ⊆ J for some J ∈ J and ψ(σ  x) 	= ?.
Ifψ(σ) = ?, then Case 2 holds for σ  x. By our choice ofψ , this implies thatψ(τ) = ? for every initial segment τ of σ ,
and it easily follows that content(θ(σ )) is the empty set. Since f is a surjection, there is K ∈ S such that f (K) = h(ψ(σ  x)),
and trivially content(θ(σ )) = ∅ ⊆ K . Thus, φ(σ  x) is well-deﬁned, and it is easy to see that all parts of the claim are
satisﬁed for σ  x.
Next, assumeψ(σ) 	= ? and thatψ(σ  x) 	= ψ(σ). Our choice ofψ guarantees that content(σ ) ⊆ h(ψ(σ  x)). There-
fore, by the induction hypothesis, h(ψ(σ  x)) ∈ f (↑S content(θ(σ ))). It follows that there exists a K ∈ S such that
f (K) = h(ψ(σ  x)) and content(θ(σ )) ⊆ K . Thus, φ(σ  x) is well-deﬁned, and all parts of the claim are easily seen to
hold.
Finally, assumeψ(σ  x) = ψ(σ) 	= ?. Since Case 3 holds,φ(σ  x) = φ(σ), and so f (φ(σ  x)) = h(ψ(σ  x)) by the
induction hypothesis. Furthermore, since the induction hypothesis implies that ↑J content(σ  x) ⊆ f (↑S content(θ(σ ))),
it is clear that there exists some j ≥ 0 that satisﬁes ↑J content(σ  x) ⊆ f (↑S Xj), since at least zero can be chosen. Since θ
(σ  x) = θ(σ )  τ and τ is chosen so that content(τ ) = φ(σ) ∩ Fj , it is clear that content(θ(σ  x)) = Xj , hence ↑J
content(σ  x) ⊆ f (↑S content(θ(σ  x))). From content(θ(σ )) ⊆ φ(σ) and content(τ ) ⊆ φ(σ) it easily follows that
content(θ(σ  x)) ⊆ φ(σ) = φ(σ  x). 
Let T be a text for some J ∈ J . Sinceψ learnsJ , there is somem such that h(ψ(T[n])) = J for all n ≥ m. LetK = φ(T[m]).
It follows from the construction of φ that φ(T[n]) = K for all n ≥ m. Furthermore, it follows from the claim that f (K) = J
and content(θ(T[n])) ⊆ K for all n ≥ m.
We next show that θ(T) = ⋃{θ(T[n]) | n ∈ N} is a text for K , by showing that, for each x ∈ K , there exists n such that
x ∈ θ(T[n]). Let x be any element of K , and let U =↑S ((K ∩ Fx+1) ∪ content(θ(T[m])). Clearly K ∈ U and it follows that
J ∈ f (U). Since U is -open, f (U) is -open in J , so let F be a ﬁnite subset of J such that J ∈↑J F ⊆ f (U). Let n be the least
number larger than both x + 1 and m such that F ⊆ content(T[n]). If x ∈ content(θ(T[n])), then we are done. So suppose
otherwise. Since x 	∈ content(θ(T[n])), note that
(K ∩ Fx+1) ∪ content(θ(T[m])) = (K ∩ Fx+1) ∪ content(θ(T[n]))
holds. This is because only Case 3 holds for all stages after m, and therefore θ does not output any y > x that is not already
in content(θ(T[m])) until x has been output. Thus,
↑J content(T[n]) ⊆↑J F ⊆ f (U) = f (↑S ((K ∩ Fx+1) ∪ content(θ(T[n]))).
By the deﬁnition of Case 3 above, this implies that x ∈ content(θ(T[n + 1])). Since xwas arbitrary, it follows that θ(T) is
a text for K .
We then deﬁne : T (J ) → T (K) so that (T) equals the limit of applying θ to each initial ﬁnite segment of T .  is
-continuous because any ﬁnite portion of the output of  only depends on a ﬁnite portion of the input. The properties
of θ show that τK((T (J ))) = S , and that τJ = f ◦ τK ◦ . By deﬁning K ≡K K ′ if and only if K = K ′ or else K ∈ S and
f (K) = f (K ′), we easily see that  and ≡K together fulﬁll the requirements of Proposition 8. Therefore, J ≤W K. 
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By reviewing the proof of Theorem 10, it is clear that J ≤W K implies there exists an open surjection from a subspace of
K to J even for arbitrary J . In general, however, an open surjection is not sufﬁcient to guarantee weak reducibility when J
is not learnable, which we will now show.
Deﬁnition 11 ( Jain et al. [12]). A concept space L is quasi-dense if L is non-empty and for any ﬁnite F ⊆ N, either there exists
no concept in L containing F or else there exist inﬁnitely many distinct concepts in L containing F .
Proposition 12. Assume J is a countable concept space and K is quasi-dense. Then there exists an open surjection f : S → J
for some subspace S of K.
Proof. Let {Fi}i∈N be an enumeration of all ﬁnite subsets ofN such that↑K Fi is non-empty for all i ∈ N. Let q:N × N → K be
an injection such that Fi ⊆ q(〈i, j〉) for each 〈i, j〉 ∈ N × N. Such an injection can easily be constructed because by assumption↑K Fi is an inﬁnite subset ofK for each i ∈ N. LetS be the range of q, and for eachK ∈ S let p(K) be such that q(〈i, p(K)〉) = K .
Note that p is a surjection ontoN and is uniquely determined because q is a bijection onto S . Also note that for any non-empty
-open subset U of S , p(U), the image of U under p, is equal to the whole of N. Let g:N → J be a surjection, and deﬁne
f : S → J as f = g ◦ p. Since f (U) = J for any non-empty -open subset U of S , f is an open surjection. 
Thus, if K contains a quasi-dense subspace and J is countable, there exists an open surjection from a subspace of K to
J . Since there are countable concept spaces that are not learnable, and concept spaces with quasi-dense subspaces that are
learnable, this shows that Theorem 10 cannot be generalized in its current form to allow non-learnableJ . Wewill havemore
to say about quasi-dense spaces when we discuss scattered spaces below.
We do, however, have a complete characterization of strong reductions. Luo and Schulte [19] were the ﬁrst to notice that
a strong reduction between concept spaces induces an injective continuous function between them, and we can easily see
from Corollary 4 that the converse also holds.
Corollary 13. For any concept spaces J and K, J ≤S K if and only if there exists a -continuous injection from J to K.
Proof. If 〈,	〉 is a strong reduction fromJ toK, then the open surjection f obtained in the proof of Theorem10 is a bijection
from S to J (remember that we can get an open surjection without any requirements on J ). We can then deﬁne g:J → K
by g(J) = K ⇐⇒ f (K) = J, which is a well-deﬁned -continuous injective function because f is an open bijection.
On theotherhand, ifg:J → K is a-continuous injection, then fromCorollary4 thereexists a-continuous: T (J ) →
T (K) such that g ◦ τJ = τK ◦ . Clearly  satisﬁes Proposition 8 with ≡K as the usual equality on K. 
4. Algebraic closure operators
We next give a way of analyzing the structure of a concept space using algebraic closure operators. Several terms such
as closed set and compact will clash with their topological meanings, but it should be clear from context what we mean,
because the -topology is on a concept space (i.e., a set of subsets of N), whereas the algebraic closure operators we discuss
are deﬁned on N itself. Thus if we talk about the closure of a set of natural numbers, it is clear that we are not referring to
any -closed set.
Deﬁnition 14 (see [6]). Let U be a set, and let C: 2U → 2U be a mapping on the powerset of U. C is called an algebraic closure
operator on U if the following conditions hold for all subsets X and Y of U:
1. X ⊆ C(X) (extensive)
2. C(X) = C(C(X)) (idempotent)
3. X ⊆ Y implies C(X) ⊆ C(Y) (monotone)
4. C(X) = ⋃{C(F) | F is a ﬁnite subset of X} (ﬁnitary)
An operator that only fulﬁlls the ﬁrst three conditions above is simply called a closure operator. A closed set or a ﬁxed point of
C is a set X such that X = C(X). A ﬁnitely generated closed set is a set X such that X = C(F) for some ﬁnite subset F of U.
The set of all ﬁxed points of an algebraic closure operator is called an algebraic closure system. An algebraic closure system
C forms a complete lattice (ordered by subset inclusion) where:
∨
i∈I
C(Xi) = C
⎛
⎝⋃
i∈I
Xi
⎞
⎠ and ∧
i∈I
C(Xi) =
⋂
i∈I
C(Xi).
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Given a poset P, a non-empty subset D of P is called a directed set if for all x, y ∈ D, there exists z ∈ D such that x ≤ z and
y ≤ z.
Deﬁnition 15. Let L be a lattice and let x be an element of L. We say that x is compact if and only if for every directed set
D ⊆ L such that x ≤ ∨D, there exists an element d ∈ D such that x ≤ d.
The compact elements of an algebraic closure systemareprecisely theﬁnitely generated closed sets [6]. Compact elements
are sometimes called ﬁnite or ﬁnitary elements. We now introduce the following closure operator on N with respect to a
given concept space.
Deﬁnition 16. Let L be a concept space. For any subset S of N, let
CL(S) =
⋃{⋂{
L ∈ L | F ⊆ L
} ∣∣∣ F is a ﬁnite subset of S}.
Deﬁne A(L) to be the set of ﬁxed points of CL(·).
It can be shown that A(L) is the smallest algebraic closure system on N that contains L (we should note that we follow
the convention that
⋂∅ = N). Intuitively, given a set S ⊆ N, CL(S) is the largest subset of N that we can be sure is included
in each concept of L that contains S, given that we can only inspect ﬁnite subsets of S at a given time. Thus, given two ﬁnite
subsets F and G of some unknown concept L ∈ L, we can think of F as containing “more information” about L than G if
CL(G) ⊂ CL(F).
The -topology on A(L) is precisely the Scott-topology on A(L) when viewed as a lattice (see [10] for more on the
Scott-topology). It follows that a function f :A(K) → A(L) is -continuous (equivalently, Scott-continuous) if and only if
f (
∨
D) = ∨ f (D) for every directed subset D of A(K).
Deﬁnition 17. Let K and L be concept spaces, and let f :K → L be a -continuous function. Deﬁne A(f ):A(K) → A(L)
so that for each X ∈ A(K), A(f )(X) = ⋃{⋂{f (K) | F ⊆ K ∈ K} | F is a ﬁnite subset of X}.
The following can be proven as a special case of proposition II-3.9 in [10].
Theorem 18. For any -continuous function f :K → L, A(f ):A(K) → A(L) is Scott-continuous and A(f )(L) = f (L) for all
L ∈ L. Furthermore,A(f ) is the supremum (ordered pointwise, i.e., g ≤ h iff g(X) ⊆ h(X) for all X) of all such Scott-continuous
extensions of f .
Thus, given a text T for some L ∈ L, we can let D = {X0, X1, X2, . . .} represent the ascending chain of the closed sets
produced by applying CL to the set of natural numbers appearing in each initial ﬁnite segment of T . Since L = ∨i∈N Xi = ∨D
and D is directed, in fact a chain, f (L) = A(f )(∨D) = ∨A(f )(D). Thus, we can produce a text for f (L) by enumerating in
parallel the elements of eachA(f )(Xi), while we can obtain each Xi by seeing more and more of T . This observation could be
used to prove the existence of g: T (K) → T (L) in Corollary 4.
More abstractly, we can think ofA(f ):A(K) → A(L) as amapping from partial information about some K ∈ K to partial
information about f (K) ∈ L. The fact that it is the supremum of all continuous extensions means that it is the “best” such
mapping of partial information.
We mention to those familiar with category theory that, despite our notation, A is not a functor because although it
preserves identities it does not preserve composition.5
5. Structural properties of concept spaces
We now introduce a handful of structural properties that have been introduced by learning theorists to characterize the
learnability of concept spaces. We can only give a brief explanation of their importance, and the reader should consult the
references for more details. In the following sections, we will assume that K and L are arbitrary concept spaces.
5.1. Finite thickness and ﬁnite elasticity
The ﬁrst two structural properties of concept spaces that we will consider are ﬁnite thickness and ﬁnite elasticity. Both are
sufﬁcient conditions for a concept space to be learnable in the limit.
5 Herewe give a simple examplewhereA(g) ◦A(f ) 	= A(g ◦ f ).Wewill denote subsets of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} bywritingXwith a subscript listing the elements
it contains (e.g., X024 = {0, 2, 4}). LetJ = {X01, X02},K = {X01, X02, X03}, andL = {X014, X024, X03}. Deﬁne f :J → K and g:K → L so that f (X01) = X01,
f (X02) = X02, g(X01) = X014, g(X02) = X024, and g(X03) = X03. Then (A(g) ◦A(f ))(X0) = X0, butA(g ◦ f )(X0) = X04.
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Deﬁnition 19 (Angluin [1]).We say that L has ﬁnite thickness if and only if for each x ∈ N, ↑L {x} is ﬁnite.
Finite thickness was introduced by Angluin, and is well known to be a property held by pattern languages [1].
Deﬁnition 20 (Wright [30],Motoki et al. [23]).Wesay thatLhas inﬁnite elasticity if andonly if there exists an inﬁnite sequence
of concepts L1, L2, L3, . . . in L and elements x0, x1, x2, . . . such that {x0, . . . , xn−1} ⊆ Ln but xn 	∈ Ln. L has ﬁnite elasticity if
and only if it does not have inﬁnite elasticity.
Finite elasticity is strictly weaker than ﬁnite thickness and was introduced by Wright [30] because it is preserved under
“unions” of concept spaces (we use quotations and the symbol ∪˜ to distinguish from the set theoretical deﬁnition of union):
Theorem 21 (Wright [30]). If K and L have ﬁnite elasticity, then their “union” K ∪˜ L = {K ∪ L | K ∈ K and L ∈ L} has ﬁnite
elasticity.
Neither ﬁnite thickness nor ﬁnite elasticity is a topological property in the sense that neither is topologically invariant [16].
A topologically invariant property is a property that if held by one space is held by every other homeomorphic space. As an
example showing that ﬁnite thickness and ﬁnite elasticity are not topologically invariant, we let SINGLE = {{n} | n ∈ N}
and let L1 = {Li | i ≥ 0} ∪ {Ji | i ≥ 0} where:
L0={〈n, 0〉 | n ∈ N} ∪ {〈0, 1〉}
Li={〈n, 0〉 | 0 ≤ n ≤ 2i & n 	= i} ∪ {〈i, 1〉} (for i > 0)
J0={〈n, 1〉 | n ∈ N} ∪ {〈0, 0〉}
Ji={〈n, 1〉 | 0 ≤ n ≤ 2i & n 	= i} ∪ {〈i, 0〉} (for i > 0)
Clearly, SINGLE has ﬁnite thickness. However, since L1 ∪ J1 ⊂ L2 ∪ J2 ⊂ · · · and L0 ∪ J0 = ⋃i≥1 Li ∪ Ji, it can be proven
that L1 ∪˜ L1 is not learnable from positive data. Therefore, L1 does not have ﬁnite elasticity. But it can easily be shown that
L1 is homeomorphic to SINGLE , because L0 is the only concept that contains the subset {〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}, J0 is the only
one that contains {〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 1〉} and all other concepts are ﬁnite and not contained in any other concept. Hence, both
L1 and SINGLE are countably inﬁnite sets with the discrete topology.
Since we have shown that ﬁnite thickness and ﬁnite elasticity are not topologically invariant, we cannot hope to have
a nice topological characterization of these properties. However, there is a nice characterization of ﬁnite elasticity using
algebraic closure operators.
Theorem 22. The following are equivalent for any concept space L.
1. L has ﬁnite elasticity.
2. A(L) has ﬁnite elasticity.
3. A(L) is Noetherian (every strictly increasing chain of closed sets is ﬁnite).
4. Every closed set in A(L) is compact.
5. A(L) is learnable in the limit from positive data.
The main parts of the proofs follow from Theorems 7 and 12 in [7] and Lemma 9 in [8].6 The equivalence of Noetherian
and learnable algebraic closure systems is a generalization of the same result in [28] for the class of ideals of a ring.
5.2. Scattered concept spaces
Scattered concept spaces are deﬁned topologically, and therefore the property is easily seen to be topologically invariant.
The notion was introduced to the learning community by Luo and Schulte [19] as a means of characterizing mind-change
complexity. Mind-change complexity is a means of measuring the “difﬁculty” of a learning problem using ordinals. We will
use the standard deﬁnition of a learner in the following deﬁnition, with the convention that for every learner ψ , ψ(ε) = ?,
where ε is the empty sequence.
Deﬁnition 23 (Freivalds and Smith [9]).Given anordinalα, anα-mind-change counter for a learnerψ is a functionρψ : SEQ →
(α + 1) such thatρψ(ε) = α andψ(σ) 	= ψ(σ  x) impliesρψ(σ) > ρψ(σ  x).We say that a concept spaceL is learnable
withmind-change boundα if and only if there exists someψ that learnsLwith someα-mind-change counterρψ .We say that
Lhasmind-change complexityα if and only ifL is learnablewithmind-change boundα but is not learnablewithmind-change
bound β for any β < α.
6 The closure operator deﬁned in [8] is different than the one proposed here, although they are equivalent for concept spaces with ﬁnite elasticity.
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Intuitively, when the learner changes its hypothesis, it must decrement its ordinal counter without going below zero.
Some learning theorists (such as Luo and Schulte [19]) do not require the learner to decrement its counter when its previous
hypothesis was “?”. We do require that the learner decrement its counter after every change of hypothesis, because we feel
that the theory becomesmoremathematically natural thisway (see [22] for further support for this approach tomind-change
complexity). For example, given a countable ordinal α, deﬁne αop to be some concept space homeomorphic to α with the
lower topology.7 Using our deﬁnition, for every countable ordinal α, the concept space αop has mind-change complexity α,
whereas according to Luo and Schulte’s deﬁnition, ωop and (ω + 1)op would both have mind-change complexity ω. Thus,
our deﬁnition of accumulation order (Deﬁnition 25 below) is slightly different than [19], but has the advantage that it is
equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of the Cantor-Bendixon rank of a topological space (see [15]). The differences areminor,
and it is easily seen that we can still use Luo and Schulte’s results by slightly adjusting them to meet our deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 24. A concept L ∈ X ⊆ L is an isolated point of X if and only if there is a -open subset U of L such that
X ∩ U = {L}. If L ∈ X ⊆ L and L is not an isolated point of X , then L is an accumulation point of X .
Deﬁnition 25 (see [15,19]). Let L be a concept space. For each ordinal α, the αth derived set of L, denoted L(α), is deﬁned
inductively as follows:
1. L(0) is deﬁned to be L.
2. If α is a successor ordinal, then L(α) is deﬁned to be the set of all accumulation points of L(α−1).
3. If α is a limit ordinal, then L(α) is deﬁned to be⋂β<α L(β).
The accumulation order of a concept L ∈ L, denoted accL(L), is deﬁned as the maximal ordinal α such that L ∈ L(α) (if the
maximumexists). The accumulation order of a concept spaceL, denoted acc(L), is the least ordinalα such thatL(α) = L(α+1).
If acc(L) = α and L(α) is empty, then L is said to be scattered.
Since all concept spaces are countably-based, it can be shown that acc(L) is deﬁned for every concept space L and is
always strictly less than ω1, the least uncountable ordinal (see Theorem I.6.9 in [15] for the key part of the proof of this
claim).
Assume L ∈ L andα = accL(L). By deﬁnition, L is an isolated point inL(α), so there is ﬁnite F ⊆ N such thatL(α) ∩ (↑L(α)
F) = {L}. Since L(α) is the subset of L of concepts with accumulation order greater than or equal to α, it follows that L is the
only concept in L that contains F and has accumulation order α.
If L is a scattered concept space, then accL(L) is deﬁned for every L ∈ L, so the proceeding observation can be used to
deﬁne an injection from L to ﬁnite subets of N. Hence, every scattered concept space contains at most a countable number
of concepts.
Luo and Schulte showed a nice connection between scattered spaces and mind change complexity.
Proposition 26 (Luo and Schulte [19]). A concept space L is learnable with a mind-change bound if and only if L is scattered. If
L is scattered, then the mind change complexity of L equals acc(L).
Scattered concept spaces also have an important role in weak reductions.
Proposition 27 (Luo and Schulte [19]). Let K be a scattered concept space. For any concept space J , if J ≤W K then J is
scattered and acc(J ) ≤ acc(K).
Aweak-complete [13] concept space is one that is learnable, and for which every other learnable concept space is weakly
reducible to it. Jain et al. [12] characterized weak-complete concept spaces as precisely those that are learnable and contain
a quasi-dense subspace.8
Theorem 28 The following are equivalent for any concept space L.
1. L is a scattered concept space.
2. L is inferable from positive data with a mind change bound.
3. L does not contain a quasi-dense subspace.
4. There exists a concept space K with ﬁnite elasticity and an injective -continuous function f :L → K.
7 The lower topology onα is that generated by sets of the form↓β = {γ ∈ α | γ ≤ β} for β ∈ α. As an example,ωop is homeomorphic to COINIT =
{{k ∈ N | k ≥ j} | j ∈ N}.
8 To be more precise, Jain et al. [12] included an effectiveness condition since they were concerned with effective learners and reductions. However, the
result can easily be generalized to this form in light of Proposition 12.
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Proof. The equivalence of 1 and 2 is themain result of [19]. To show that 1 implies 3, assume S is a quasi-dense subspace ofL.
Since any -open subset of L that intersects S intersects an inﬁnite subset of S , it can be shown using transﬁnite induction
that S ⊆ L(α) for all α, and therefore L is not scattered. To see that 3 implies 1, note that if L is not scattered then there
is a subset L(α) = L(α+1) of L (for some ordinal α) which is inﬁnite (since non-empty ﬁnite T0 spaces necessarily contain
isolated points) and easily seen to be quasi-dense.
That 4 implies 1 is also due to Luo and Schulte [19], since they showed that every concept space with ﬁnite elasticity is
scattered. The rest follows from Corollary 13 and Proposition 27.
To show 2 implies 4, assume that L is learnable with mind-change bound α. Let ι be an indexing of L (i.e., ι:L → N
is an injective function). For L ∈ L, deﬁne Kι(L) = {ι(L′) | L = L′ or accL(L) < accL(L′)}, and let K = {Kι(L) | L ∈ L}. K has
ﬁnite elasticity, because a proof that K has inﬁnite elasticity could be used to construct an inﬁnitely decreasing sequence of
ordinals.9 Finally, the function f :L → K such that f (L) = Kι(L) is clearly an injection and can be shown to be-continuous
in the usual way. 
The equivalence of 1 and 4 is interesting because it is an example of reducing a “complicated” concept space to a less
“complicated” one (in the sense that each concept Kι(L) in K is the closure of the single natural number ι(L), and A(K) is
Noetherian; see Theorem 22). The equivalence of 2 and 3 is particularly interesting because it shows that a concept space is
weak-complete if and only if it is learnable, but not with any mind change bound. Combined with Luo and Schulte’s work on
the relationship betweenweak-reductions andmind-change complexity, this shows thatwithout any restrictions concerning
computability, the ordering relation between learnable concept spaces induced by weak reductions is strictly weaker than
the ordering relation induced by mind-change complexity.
5.3. Alexandrov concept spaces
Alexandrov spaces are topological spaces that are useful because of their close relationship to partial orders (see [14]).
Deﬁnition 29 An Alexandrov concept space is a concept space where, for each concept L, there exists a smallest open set
containing L.
Note that if U is the smallest open set containing L ∈ L, then U must be equal to ↑L L. The following two structural
properties of concept spaces were proposed as sufﬁcient conditions for computable learners to learn an indexed family of
recursive sets.
Deﬁnition 30 (Angluin [2], Kobayashi [18]). Let L be a concept in L. A characteristic set for L is a ﬁnite set F such that F ⊆ L
and for all L′ ∈ L, if F ⊆ L′ then L ⊆ L′.
Deﬁnition 31 (Sato and Umayahara [25]). A concept L ∈ L has an inﬁnite cross sequence if and only if there exists an inﬁnite
sequence L0, L1, . . . of concepts in L such that
1. S0(	= ∅), S1, . . . is strictly monotone-increasing, and
2. limi→∞ Si = L,
where Si = ⋂∞j=i(Lj ∩ L) for i ≥ 0. We say that L has ﬁnite cross property if and only if no concept in L has an inﬁnite cross
sequence.
The following theorem shows that the topologically invariant property of being an Alexandrov space is equivalent to
each concept having a characteristic set and also equivalent to the ﬁnite cross property. It also makes it clear that every
Alexandrov concept space is countable, because any mapping that sends a concept to a characteristic set for the concept
would necessarily be one-to-one.
Theorem 32. The following are equivalent for any concept space L.
1. L is an Alexandrov concept space.
2. Every L in L has a characteristic set.
3. L has ﬁnite cross property.
4. Every L in L is compact in A(L).
Proof. The equivalence of 2 and 3 is from [24]. If L is Alexandrov and L ∈ L then ↑L L is -open, hence it must be equal
to ↑L F for some F ⊆ L (since -open sets are deﬁned in terms of unions of -basic open sets), which means that F is a
characteristic set for L. Therefore, 1 implies 2. The implication from 2 to 1 is similar. The deﬁnition of CL(·) makes it clear
9 The reader should also note that acc(L) = acc(K), which follows from Theorem 35 (below) and the fact that Kι(L) ⊂ Kι(L′) iff accL(L) > accL(L′).
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that for any ﬁnite F ⊆ L, CL(F) = L iff F is a characteristic set for L, hence the equivalence of 2 and 4 (see the comment after
Deﬁnition 15). 
The topological properties of an Alexandrov concept space are determined by the subset relation among its concepts.
-continuous mappings to and from Alexandrov concept spaces are particularly easy to work with because of the following
two lemmas (we leave the easy proofs to the reader).
Lemma 33. For any Alexandrov concept space L and any concept space K, a map f :L → K is -continuous if and only if it is
monotonic with respect to set inclusion.
Note, however, that all -continuous functions are monotonic. The above lemma shows that monotonicity is sufﬁcient
for Alexandrov concept spaces.
Lemma 34. Assume that L is an Alexandrov concept space, and let f :K → L be a -continuous map from any concept spaceK
to L. Then for every K ∈ K there is a ﬁnite F ⊆ K such that A(f )(CK(F)) = f (K).
It is easy to see that the class of scattered Alexandrov concept spaces properly contains the class of concept spaces with
ﬁnite elasticity. In addition, there exists non-scattered Alexandrov spaces, such as FIN (the set of all ﬁnite subsets of N),
and also non-Alexandrov scattered spaces, such as L2 = {Lω} ∪ {Li | i ≥ 0}, where Li = {〈i, 1〉} ∪ {〈j, 0〉 | j ≤ i} for i ≥ 0,
and Lω = {〈j, 0〉 | j ≥ 0}.
The accumulation order of scattered Alexandrov concept spaces has the following simple characterization (which is a
transﬁnite generalization of Luo and Schulte’s notion of inclusion depth [19]). For any scattered Alexandrov concept space
L, inductively deﬁne μL(L) = sup{μL(L′) + 1 | L ⊂ L′ ∈ L} for L ∈ L (the supremum in the deﬁnition of μL exists, since
otherwise Lwould contain a strictly increasing inﬁnite chain of concepts, which would contradict the assumption that L is
scattered).
Theorem 35. acc(L) = sup{μL(L) + 1 | L ∈ L} for any scattered Alexandrov concept space L.
Proof.Note that, sinceL is scattered and Alexandrov,↑L L is a-open set containing L and no other concept with accumula-
tion order greater than or equal to accL(L). The theorem can be easily proven by transﬁnite induction using this observation
(we omit the details). 
5.4. Finite tell-tales
The lastmajor propertywewill investigate is the notion of a ﬁnite tell-tale. Thiswas given by Angluin as part of a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for the learnability of a concept space.
Deﬁnition 36 (Angluin [1]). Let L be a concept in L. A ﬁnite tell-tale for L is a ﬁnite set F such that F ⊆ L and for all L′ ∈ L, if
F ⊆ L′ then L′ 	⊂ L.
This is related to the following topological notion (this is the only place in this paper where “closed” is meant in the
topological sense).
Deﬁnition 37. A subset S of topological space X is locally closed in X if and only if there exists an open set U and a closed set
V such that S = U ∩ V .
The following is a separation axiom proposed by Aull and Thron [3] that is strictly between the T0 and T1 axioms.
10
Deﬁnition 38 (Aull and Thron [3]). A TD-space is a topological space X such that {x} is locally closed in X for every x ∈ X .
Theorem 39. The following are equivalent for any concept space L.
1. L is countable and every L in L has a ﬁnite tell-tale.
2. L is learnable in the limit from positive data.
3. L is a countable TD-space.
4. There exists an Alexandrov concept space K and an injective -continuous function f :L → K.
10 See [14].
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Proof. The equivalence of 1 and 2 is essentially due to Angluin [1] (she proved an effective version, but the generalized
version is an easy corollary [21]).
That 1 implies 3 can easily be seen by noting that↓L L is-closed for every L ∈ L, and a ﬁnite tell-tale F of Lwould imply
(↑L F) ∩ (↓L L) = {L}. To show that 3 implies 1, assume there are -open U and -closed V such that U ∩ V = {L}. Then
there is a ﬁnite F ⊆ L such that L ∈↑L F ⊆ U, and since ↓L L ⊆ V , it is clear that (↑L F) ∩ (↓L L) = {L}. Therefore, F is a
ﬁnite tell-tale of L.
The proof that 2 implies 4 is due to Jain et al. [12], where they showed that every learnable concept space can be strongly
reduced to RINIT 0,1, which is deﬁned as all subsets of the rationals Q of the form {q ∈ Q | 0 ≤ q ≤ r} for each rational
r between 0 and 1 (inclusive). RINIT 0,1 is easily seen to be an Alexandrov concept space ({r} is a characteristic set for{q ∈ Q | 0 ≤ q ≤ r}), and the essence of their proof (although it is done for effective learners) can easily be generalized. This
induces, as we mentioned earlier, an injective -continuous function f from L toRINIT 0,1.
To see that 4 implies 1, let L ∈ Lbegiven. By Lemma34, there is aﬁnite F ⊆ L such thatA(f )(CL(F)) = f (L). For any L′ ∈ L
such that L′ ⊆ L and F ⊆ L′, the monotonicity of A(f ) implies that A(f )(CL(F)) ⊆ A(f )(L′) ⊆ A(f )(L). Thus f (L′) = f (L).
Since f is injective, L = L′. 
It is clear from the above proof that the TD axiom states that every concept has a ﬁnite tell-tale (even when the concept
space is not countable). Since the space of real numbers with the Euclidean topology satisﬁes the TD axiom, and since
this property is topologically invariant, every real number has a ﬁnite tell-tale in any interpretation of the real line as a
(homeomorphic) concept space (in fact, the empty set always sufﬁces as a ﬁnite tell-tale because no real number will be a
subset of any other).
Since the space of realsR is uncountable, it is not learnable by the standard deﬁnition. However, if we letHR = {η(x) | x ∈
R}, where η(x) = {〈c, r〉 ∈ Q × Q | r > |x − c|} if x ∈ R\Q and η(x) = {〈x, 0〉} if x ∈ Q (Q being the set of rationals), and
let hR:HR → R be deﬁned as hR(η(x)) = x, then we can see that the Euclidean real line is learnable according to Deﬁnition
5 using the non-discrete hypothesis space 〈HR , hR〉. Intuitively, a learner in this case would be required to converge exactly
for rational numbers, but only gradually for irrational numbers.
Given a hypothesis space 〈H, h〉 for L and a -continuous injection f :L → K to an Alexandrov concept space K, we can
deﬁne a learner ψf for L in the following way. Let ψf (ε) = ?. Assume ψf (σ ) is deﬁned, and for x ∈ N ∪ {#}, let:
ψf (σ  x) =
{
HL if A(f )(CL(content(σ  x))) = f (L),
ψf (σ ) otherwise;
whereHL ∈ H is some pre-deﬁned hypothesis such that h(HL) = L. From the above theorem, it is easy to see thatψf learnsL
in the limit from positive data. Although not all learners for L can be deﬁned in this way, many “intuitive” learning strategies
are of this form. For example, consider L2, which we gave earlier as an example of a scattered concept space that is not
Alexandrov. We can deﬁne a concept space N⊥ = {N⊥} ∪ {Ni | i ≥ 0}, where N⊥ = {0} and Ni = {0, i + 1}. Deﬁne the -
continuous function f :L2 → N⊥ so that f (Lω) = N⊥ and f (Li) = Ni for i ≥ 0. Intuitively, ψf chooses a hypothesis for Lω
until it sees evidence that conﬁrms otherwise. It is easy to see that ψf learns L2 with an optimal mind-change bound.
Finally, we mention that the class of countable TD concept spaces properly includes both the class of Alexandrov concept
spaces and the class of scattered concept spaces. An example of a learnable concept space that is neither Alexandrov nor
scattered is COSINGLE = {N\{n} | n ∈ N}. The “intuitive” learning strategy for this space is given by a -continuous
injection into the ordinal ω (viewed as a concept space, i.e., for each n ∈ N there is a concept n¯ ∈ ω containing all natural
numbers less than n) which maps N\{n} to n¯.
6. Concluding remarks
We have made several connections between topology and learning in the limit, and have analyzed some of the structural
properties of concept spaces, with an emphasis on topologically invariant properties.
By interpreting both texts and hypothesis spaces topologically, we can now apply the information theoretic intuitions
from topology and domain theory to various aspects of the learning process. For example, open sets are often thought of as
“observable” properties by domain theorists (see [27,4]), and since the goal of learning is to identify a particular point in the
space, smaller open sets can be viewed as more informative observations (see the introduction of [10]).
It is important to note that the topology on the concept space is determinedby theway it is presented, thus informants and
queries will result in different topologies on the concept space. For example, an informant for a concept L ∈ L is a sequence
containing all elements of N marked with ﬂags telling whether or not each element is in L. This means that, for any ﬁnite
F ⊆ N, both ↑L F and L\(↑L F) are observable. The topology on L generated by these sets could be called the positive and
negative information topology on L, and it is readily veriﬁed that the informant representation of L is admissible with respect
to this topology. In the case of queries, if the learner is allowed to ask if some set X ⊆ N is a subset of the target concept, and
in response receives a yes or no answer, then the propeties ↑L X and L\(↑L X) are observable. In this way we can deﬁne a
query topology on L that characterizes the properties that the learner can observe by asking the right questions.
A hypothesis space 〈H, h〉 usually induces an even ﬁner topology on the concept space (by taking the quotient topology
with respect to h). Thus, 〈H, h〉 is amore “informative” representation of the concept space than texts are, since itmakesmore
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properties observable. This gives us an information theoretic interpretation of learning as the process of converting a given
representation of a concept into amore “informative” representation. However, since the limiting process is non-continuous,
the open sets induced by H are only observable in the limit, via the learner, given the initial representation of the concept
space by texts.
Cartesian closed categories are important in modeling the semantics of computation, but unfortunately the category of
countably based T0 spaces is not cartesian closed. However, by replacing T(L) with an admissible representation for L in
Deﬁnition 5, we can naturally extend the learning in the limit paradigm to the cartesian closed category of spaces with
admissible representations [26]. Such a generalization would give an approach to investigating the semantic connections
between learning and computation. We expect that this would lead to a more “goal oriented” approach to learning, where
the interest becomes determining whether or not a concept space can be learned “well enough” to compute some function
between concept spaces to an arbitrarily high precision. This approach would require us to allow non-discrete hypothesis
spaces (or take some similar tactic) to relax our deﬁnition of convergence.
The “problem of induction” occurs when generalizing a ﬁnite number of observations to an inﬁnite concept, or in other
words, when the learner conjectures a concept that is not completely entailed by the observations. By saying that a set of
observations X entails a set Y , wemean that Y ⊆ CL(X). The use of theword “entails” is justiﬁed, and can bemore thoroughly
formalized, by the fact that 〈A(L), CL〉 is essentially an abstract algebraic logic (see [5]), wherewe viewN as a set of formulas,
and logical consequence between a set of formulas X and a formulaφ is given by X  φ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ CL(X). The role of closure
operators in learning is that they give an upper bound of what deductive reasoning (meaning true assumptions lead to true
conclusions) can tell us about which elements of N are “true” in the sense that they belong to the unknown concept being
presented. Theseobservations are important so thatwecanbetter distinguishbetween thedeductive and inductive reasoning
that is used in learning.
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